Clipping Management and Nitrogen Fertilization of Turfgrass: Growth, Nitrogen Utilization, and Quality

The effect of returning grass clippings on turfgrass growth and quality has not been thoroughly examined. The objective of this research was to determine the effects of returning grass clippings in combination with varying N rates on growth, N utilization, and quality of turfgrass managed as a residential lawn. Two field experiments using a cool-season turfgrass mixture were arranged as a 2 x 4 factorial in a randomized complete block design with three replicates. Treatments included two clipping management practices (returned or removed) and four N rates (equivalent to 0, 98, 196, and 392 kg N ha(-1)). Soils at the two sites were a Paxton fine sandy loam (coarse-loamy, mixed, active, mesic Oxyaquic Dystrudepts) and a variant of a Hinckley gravelly sandy loam (sandy-skeletal, mixed, mesic Typic Udorthents). Returning clippings was found to increase clipping dry matter yields (DMYs) from 30 to 72%, total N uptake (NUP) from 48 to 60%, N recovery by 62%, and N use efficiency (NUE) from 52 to 71%. Returning grass clippings did not decrease turfgrass quality, and improved it in some plots. We found that N fertilization rates could be reduced 50% or more without decreasing turfgrass quality when clippings were returned. Overall, returning grass clippings was found to improve growth and quality of turfgrass while reducing N fertilization needs.

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.